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Abstract 
 
Using a sample of bank failures over the period 2008-2010, we analyze the role of 
different types of regulatory capital in providing a buffer against failure risk. We report three key 
findings. First, we document that bank failure risk is negatively associated with Tier 1 capital, 
but positively associated with Tier 2 capital, which consists primarily of loan loss reserves. The 
results suggest that, contrary to the conventional notion of capital, a higher level of Tier 2 capital 
does not necessarily provide a buffer against deteriorating economic conditions. Second, the 
quality of Tier 2 capital is weaker (that is, its positive association with failure risk is higher) 
when banks report unusually large increases in loan loss reserves. Finally, the negative influence 
of unusually large loan loss reserves on the quality of Tier 2 capital is more pronounced for 
banks that are less constrained in adding back such reserves as Tier 2 capital, banks that have 
poorer audit quality and banks in which agency problems are more severe. Overall, our results 
suggest that Tier 2 capital is of low quality when banks use loan loss reserves to manage 
regulatory capital upwards.  
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I. Introduction 
In contrast to the common wisdom that greater capital lowers bank failure risk, this paper 
deals with the issue of whether certain components of bank regulatory capital can increase the 
probability of bank failure. In particular, we focus on the regulatory capital guideline that allows 
loss reserves to be considered as capital. Under this guideline, a bank can add back its loan loss 
reserves, which are cumulative accrued loan losses, as Tier 2 capital. Our paper documents that 
in contrast to Tier 1 capital, Tier 2 capital is positively associated with the risk of bank failure 
during the recent economic crisis that precipitated widespread bank failures from 2008 to 2010. 
The positive association between Tier 2 capital and bank failure suggests that, contrary to the 
conventional notion of capital, a higher level of Tier 2 capital does not necessarily provide a 
buffer against deteriorating economic conditions.  Further, the positive association between Tier 
2 capital and failure risk is stronger when banks report increases in loan loss reserves that (a) are 
larger than warranted given the banks’ non-performing loans, and (b) are likely to reflect upward 
capital management.   
For US commercial banks, Tier 2 capital primarily consists of loan loss reserves.1 The 
treatment of loan loss reserves (i.e., accrued loan losses) as capital has received considerable 
attention in the wake of the financial crisis. In speaking at the American Bankers Association 
meeting on March 17, 2010, Comptroller of the Currency John Dugan argued for the relaxation 
of restrictions on the inclusion of loan loss reserves as capital, to encourage banks to report 
adequate and timely reserves. On the following day of that same meeting, Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Chairperson Sheila Bair contested this view, arguing that “letting 
more reserves count [towards capital] could dramatically, in our view, dilute the quality of 
capital.” She also referenced the late L. William Seidman, former chairman of the FDIC, in 
                                                 
1 The primary component of Tier 1 capital for US commercial banks is shareholders’ equity. 
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saying that the rationale for adding back reserves as capital was ambiguous. Bankers have 
lobbied vigorously in favor of increasing the limit to which loan loss reserves can contribute 
towards Tier 2 capital. In an oral statement to the Domestic Policy Subcommittee of the U.S. 
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee on November 2, 2009, Joe Brennan, 
President and CEO of the Georgia Bankers Association argued for a higher limit on the loan loss 
reserves to be counted as regulatory capital. He stated that “76% of all Georgia banks were 
adversely affected by the restriction” and “that billions in capital among Georgia banks would be 
freed up to support more lending if the limit were suspended”.2 
Increases in loan loss reserves generally reduce net income and consequently, Tier 1 capital. 
Bank regulations allow the add-back of reserves as Tier 2 capital under the regulatory philosophy 
that loan loss reserves represent capital that should be “built up” during good economic times, to 
absorb losses during bad times (Wall and Koch 2000). The reserves represent the recognition of 
losses in banks’ loan portfolios that have not yet been realized. Thus, when a bank incurs actual 
cash flow losses upon defaults, it can draw down its reserves, as opposed to recognizing a 
decline in its net income. The presumption underlying the capital regulation is that since loan 
loss reserves allow a bank to recognize fewer losses at the time of defaults, they should be added 
back as Tier 2 capital.  
The countervailing view is that the treatment of loan loss reserves as capital departs from 
standard accounting and economic principles.  Note that this view does not question the 
importance of timely recognition of loan loss reserves. Indeed, evidence suggests that banks that 
recognize loan losses in a timely manner face fewer lending constraints during recessionary 
regimes (Beatty and Liao 2011).  However, the inclusion of loan loss reserves as capital is still 
                                                 
2 Other instances of bank lobbying to raise the limit on loan loss reserves that can added back to Tier 2 capital 
abound. For example, in its comment letter to the Federal Reserve Board on October 15, 2009 relating to bank 
regulators’ proposed rule-making on risk-based capital guidelines and related issues, Discover Financial Services 
argues for the increase or elimination of the current cap on loan loss reserve amount eligible to qualify as Tier 2 
capital (Federal Reserve Board 2009).  
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questionable, since the reserves represent accrued losses in the loan portfolio. Greater Tier 2 
capital, especially when resulting from large unusual increases in loan loss reserves, may reflect 
significant unaddressed problems in the banks’ assets and operations. Thus, higher Tier 2 capital 
is possibly predictive of greater failure risk, instead of providing a buffer against failure during 
times of economic crisis in line with the conventional notion of capital. The actual empirical 
effect of Tier 2 capital on bank failure is undocumented in the literature.  
Our study directly examines the association between regulatory capital (total, Tier 1, and Tier 
2) and bank failure risk. We obtain bank failure data from FDIC press releases. Data on banks’ 
regulatory capital and other accounting information is obtained from the call reports that 
commercial banks file with the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and/or the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency. As expected, we find that total regulatory capital (i.e., the sum of Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 capital) is negatively associated with bank failure risk. Next, we examine how Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 capital are individually associated with bank failure risk.  
Our results reveal that bank failure risk is associated negatively with Tier 1 capital, but 
positively with Tier 2 capital. Note that increases in loan loss reserves via loan loss provisions 
recognized on the income statement would, by decreasing shareholders’ equity, also result in 
lower Tier 1 capital. Thus, our results imply that larger loan loss reserves are associated with 
higher bank failure risk via both a reduction in Tier 1 capital and an increase in Tier 2 capital. In 
other words, Tier 2 capital reflects information about bank failure risk incremental to what is 
encapsulated in Tier 1. 
 In further analysis, we explore cross-sectional variation in the extent to which Tier 2 capital 
is positively associated with bank failure risk. Since loan loss reserves are the primary 
component of Tier 2 capital, we expect its positive association with failure risk to be more 
pronounced when loan loss reserve increases are abnormally large. It is well-documented that 
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banks attempt to manage regulatory capital upwards via abnormal loan loss provisions that 
increase loan loss reserves, in order to convey an impression of financial health to regulators 
(e.g., Moyer 1990; Beatty et al. 1995; Ahmed et al. 1999). If the unusually large loan loss reserve 
increases represent banks’ attempts to escape regulatory scrutiny by managing capital upwards, 
then such increases may be indicative of more severe problems within banks, inclusive of low-
quality management. To the extent that Tier 2 capital is built up via opportunistic loan loss 
reserve increases, we expect it to be of low quality (that is, we expect its association with bank 
failure risk to be more positive).    
Our findings confirm that the positive association between Tier 2 capital and bank failure risk 
is indeed more pronounced when banks report abnormally large loan loss provisions. We 
acknowledge that it is possible for abnormal loan loss reserve increases to reflect factors other 
than mangers’ opportunistic attempts to report higher capital. For example, unusually large loan 
loss reserve increases can reflect managers’ identification of problems in the loan portfolio that 
are not completely captured by the stock of non-performing loans.3 Therefore, we next test 
whether the documented association between Tier 2 capital and failure risk is at least partially 
the result of upwards capital management via loan loss reserve increases. Regulatory guidelines 
imply that an increase in the loan loss reserve translates into an increase in total capital as long as 
Tier 2 capital is below 1.25% of gross risk-weighted assets (we discuss this guideline in greater 
detail in Section 2.1). Above the 1.25% limit, an increase in loan loss reserves has no effect on 
regulatory capital. Unusually large loan loss reserves are more likely to reflect attempts to 
manage capital upwards for banks whose Tier 2 capital is below the 1.25% limit (see Ahmed et 
al. 1999). Further, we expect that unusually large loan loss reserves are more likely to reflect 
                                                 
3 In other words, bank managers may use accruals to convey their private information about future performance, 
consistent with Dechow (1994).  
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capital management incentives among (a) banks that have poorer quality audits and (b) banks 
that exhibit other symptoms of agency problems.  
We find that the effect of abnormal loan loss reserve increases in weakening the quality of 
Tier 2 capital (i.e., increasing its positive association with failure risk) is evident only for banks 
below the 1.25% limit. Further, the negative effect of abnormal loan loss reserves on the quality 
of Tier 2 capital is significantly more pronounced among banks with poorer audit quality and 
banks with a higher level of agency problems.  
Our paper has important implications. The results indicate that Tier 2 capital does not, on 
average, act as a buffer that protects banks against failure risk when an economic downturn 
occurs. In that sense, Tier 2 capital does not function in accordance with conventional notions of 
capital. Further, our evidence suggests that the quality of Tier 2 capital is weaker when managers 
report unusually large loan loss reserve increases with the objective of biasing reported capital 
upwards. This is presumably because upwards capital management leads to deadweight costs 
resulting from managers’ attempts to avoid/delay regulatory intervention, rather than taking 
actions necessary to improve bank performance. These costs can eventually increase the risk of 
bank failure. The results are thus related to Bushman and Williams (2009), who argue that 
greater discretion in loan loss provisioning weakens regulators’ ability to monitor and discipline 
banks. 
Our findings speak to the ongoing regulatory debate on including loan loss reserves as 
regulatory capital. As noted earlier, in the wake of the economic downturn of 2008-2009, there 
have been calls to increase the limit to which loan loss reserves can count towards Tier 2 capital. 
For example, in response to intense bank lobbying at the time of the issuance of the Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 166 and SFAS 167 in late 2009, regulators allowed 
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“transitional relief” for banks from the 1.25% limit.4 Our findings, however, question the very 
rationale for allowing the add-back of loan loss reserves as Tier 2 capital. At the very least, the 
results strike a cautionary note against expanding the add-back of loan reserves to regulatory 
capital. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our setting. Section 3 
describes our sample construction and data. Our results are presented in Section 4, and Section 5 
concludes. 
II. Institutional setting 
The recent economic crisis provides a rich setting to examine the relation between bank 
failure and regulatory capital because the crisis was characterized by a significant number of 
bank failures, and the most important role of regulatory capital is to protect banks from 
instability. Below, we discuss briefly two critical institutional factors, (a) the add-back of loan 
loss serves as regulatory capital and (b) the process of a bank failure.  
Add-back of loan loss reserves as regulatory capital 
The capital adequacy ratio, or the ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets, is the 
metric most widely relied on by regulators to monitor bank solvency (Estrella et al. 2000). There 
are two main sources of regulatory capital: Tier 1 and Tier 2. Tier 1 capital is “core” capital; it 
includes shareholders’ equity (the primary component) and disclosed reserves. Tier 2 capital is 
“secondary” capital; it includes general loss reserves, undisclosed reserves, and subordinated 
term debt. The International Basel Committee requirements specify a minimum limit of 4% for 
Tier 1 capital, and 8% for total capital. 
                                                 
4 In the first two quarters after the implementation of SFAS 166 and 167 in November 2009, a banking organization, 
under certain conditions, was permitted to include without limit in Tier 2 capital the full amount of the loan loss 
reserves. 
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In practice, Tier 2 capital consists primarily of loan loss reserves, with the restriction that the 
latter is limited to 1.25% of gross-risk-weighted assets (GRWA).5 From an accounting 
perspective, loan loss reserves recognize expected losses in the loan portfolio. That is, losses are 
accrued when expected, as opposed to expensed when realized. Hence, loan loss reserves provide 
a buffer to absorb declines in the value of the bank’s loan portfolio when the losses are realized 
in the future. In part, the add-back of loan loss reserves to regulatory capital is meant to serve as 
an incentive for the timely recording of loan losses (Wall and Koch 2000). 
A simple example illustrates the role of loan loss reserve increases in influencing regulatory 
capital.6 Assume that a bank increases its loan loss reserves by reporting a loan loss provision of 
$100, and that the statutory tax rate is 40%. This transaction, ceteris paribus, has two effects on 
regulatory capital: (i) a Tier 1 effect and (ii) a Tier 2 effect. The loan loss provision reduces 
after-tax income by $100*(1 - tax rate), or $60, which in turn reduces shareholders’ equity, and 
hence Tier 1 capital by $60. Since banking capital regulations allow loan loss reserves to be 
considered as Tier 2 capital, Tier 2 capital increases by the provision amount of $100. Total 
regulatory capital (the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2) increases by $40 as a result of the loan loss 
provision, that is, the tax rate times the provision amount. If loan loss reserves prior to the 
provision were already equal to or greater than 1.25% of GRWA, the $100 provision in the 
example would not increase Tier 2 capital. If loan loss reserves were below the 1.25% limit but 
                                                 
5 Gross risk-weighted assets equal risk-weighted assets used in the computation of the capital ratios plus excess 
allowance for loan and lease losses plus the allocated transfer risk reserve. The limit of 1.25% of gross risk-weighted 
assets on the amount of the loan loss reserves that a banking organization may include in Tier 2 capital is a standard 
included in the first capital accord of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Accord). See the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards 
(1988), paragraph 21. 
6 We thank the FDIC for confirming that our example correctly represents the effect of the regulations. 
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significantly close to it, it is possible that only a portion of the $100 loan loss provision would 
count towards Tier 2 capital, not the entire amount.7 
The example highlights that an increase in loan loss reserves can increase regulatory capital. 
Furthermore, the effect of loan loss changes on regulatory capital is dependent on the size of 
total available Tier 2 capital relative to the maximum limit allowable under current regulations. 
As discussed in the Introduction, these institutional features can play an important role in 
influencing the relation between loan loss reserve changes and the likelihood of bank failure. The 
process of such a failure is discussed below.   
Bank failure  
A bank failure is an extreme event involving the chartering authority or the FDIC 
“closing” the bank.8 Closing a bank involves shutting down its operations, re-distributing its 
assets and liabilities and, if necessary, paying off insured depositors. Generally, a bank is closed 
when the regulating authority determines that it is “critically undercapitalized” and deems it 
unable to meet its obligations to depositors and other creditors. The key attribute determining 
undercapitalization is insolvency, which occurs when the bank’s assets are worth less than its 
liabilities according to either book or market values. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 requires regulators to close banks before they reach book-
value insolvency, since the market values of bank assets are uncertain and, for troubled banks, 
typically below their book values. Another reason for bank closure is illiquidity, which occurs 
                                                 
7 Note that loan charge-offs have a slightly different effect relative to loan loss provisions. A charge-off of $100 
would reduce loan loss reserves by $100, ceteris paribus. Since charge-offs do not affect the shareholders equity 
account, the sole effect of a $100 reduction in charge-offs would be to increase Tier 2 capital, and hence total 
regulatory capital, by $100 (to the extent that loan loss reserves were within the maximum allowable limit). 
8 The chartering authority for state-chartered banks is usually the state banking department; for national banks, the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC); and for federal savings institutions, the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS). While it is much more common for the chartering authoring to close a bank, the FDIC has the 
authority, under the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, to close any bank that it considers to be critically 
undercapitalized and that does not have a plan to restore capital to an adequate level. 
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when a bank is unable to meet its current obligations as they come due. For example, when 
depositors are concerned that a bank is failing, they may withdraw their deposits and precipitate 
a liquidity crisis at the bank (bank run). Illiquidity appears to drive bank failures more commonly 
in the European Union. Because of deposit insurance and the U.S. Federal Reserve’s ability to 
provide liquidity, banks in the United States typically fail because they are insolvent as opposed 
to illiquid (Bennett 2001). 
In the event of a bank failure, the FDIC acts as a receiver and is in charge of the failure 
resolution. FDICIA mandates the use of the least-cost resolution method for bank failures, the 
objective of which is to minimize the present value of the net losses incurred by the FDIC. There 
are two primary types of failure resolution methods:  (1) purchase-and-assumption transactions 
and (2) deposit pay-offs. In a purchase-and-assumption transaction, a healthy bank acquires the 
failed bank by purchasing “some or all” of the assets and assuming “some or all” of the 
liabilities. The FDIC often provides assistance to the acquiring bank, e.g., in the form of loan-
loss sharing agreements, and then liquidates the remaining assets and liabilities, internalizing the 
cost of doing so. The acquiring bank usually compensates the FDIC for the franchise value from 
the failed bank’s established customer relationships, which helps reduce the insurer’s resolution 
cost. In a deposit-payoff transaction, the FDIC pays the failed bank’s depositors the full amount 
of their insured deposits. Typically deposit payoffs are observed when no other bank is interested 
in assuming the assets and liabilities of the failed bank. 
Variations of the two primary methods exist. For example, in a deposit transfer 
transaction, the FDIC transfers the insured deposits to a healthy bank that is willing to be an 
agent of the FDIC. The depositors can either withdraw their deposits or keep them in the new 
bank. In a bridge transaction, the FDIC itself temporarily acquires the failed bank’s assets and 
liabilities and takes over its operations while deciding on the least-cost resolution method. In a 
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more significant departure, the FDIC can engage in an open-bank transaction, in which it 
provides financial assistance to the bank while it continues operations. Open-bank transactions 
are not classified as bank failures in our sample, since they are implemented when banks’ 
liquidity and/or solvency issues are perceived as temporary.  
 
III. Sample construction 
The timeline in our research design is shown below:  
 
 
 
  
The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) identifies December 2007 as the 
beginning of the recent recession. Our empirical analysis focuses on the association between 
regulatory capital and changes in loan loss reserves that banks reported at the end of 2007 and 
the bank failures of the subsequent three years. The choice of this timeline for the research 
design is based on the idea that regulatory capital is supposed to act as a buffer that permits 
banks to insulate themselves against financial instability and failures when an economic crisis 
occurs.  
Data on bank failures  
 We obtain data on bank failures from the FDIC website: http://www.fdic.gov. The FDIC, 
which is appointed as the receiver in the event of a bank failure, makes public a press release that 
provides details about the bank at the time of the failure, including the actions being taken to deal 
with it. We collect the following information from these press releases (available on the FDIC 
website): the name of the failed bank, the bank’s estimated assets and deposits at the time of the 
2008, 2009, & 2010 
Bank failures 
(Data obtained from FDIC press releases) 
2007 
Regulatory capital and  
loan loss reserve changes 
 
(Data obtained from call reports) 
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failure, and the failure’s cost to the FDIC. As an example, the press release for the failure of 
Corus Bank is provided in Appendix A.  Corus Bank’s failure date was September 11, 2009; its 
estimated assets and deposits at the time of failure were both approximately $7 billion, and the 
cost of the failure to the FDIC was assessed at $1.7 billion.  
 Table 1 provides descriptive information about the failure of commercial banks and 
thrifts (which includes savings and loans associations and savings banks) from 2001 to 2010. 
While, for the reasons discussed below, the focus of this paper is the failure of commercial 
banks, we also provide descriptive information about the failure of thrifts to provide a broader 
overview of bank failures and to highlight the enormity of the problems facing the banking 
industry in general. Failures of commercial banks and thrifts, which were relatively infrequent 
prior to the economic recession, increased dramatically as a result of the economic crisis. A total 
of 21 commercial banks and 4 thrifts failed between the seven years from 2001 to 2007, 
compared to a total of 279 commercial banks and 42 thrifts in 2008, 2009, and 2010. Consistent 
with theories on regulatory capital (e.g., Diamond and Rajan 2000) and bank regulatory 
guidelines, we expect that it is during periods like 2008 to 2010 when regulatory capital would 
play an important role in ensuring banks’ survival and reducing the direct and indirect costs of 
bank failure. In terms of direct costs, available data indicates that the FDIC insurance fund 
largely bore the costs that arose from the bank and thrift failures of 2008 and 2009. For example, 
the total cost to the fund on account of failed commercial banks was $4.58 billion in 2008, $24.1 
billion in 2009, and $20.2 billion in 2010.  In fact, failure costs were significant enough to 
deplete the FDIC insurance fund to the point of insolvency during 2009.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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In this paper, we focus on commercial banks because (i) commercial banks and thrifts file 
different regulatory reports, (ii) detailed regulatory report data for individual commercial banks, 
both private and public, are publicly available in a machine-readable form, and (iii) the number 
of failed commercial banks is significantly larger than the number of thrifts, facilitating wide-
sample empirical analyses. For brevity, we henceforth use the term “banks” to refer to the 
commercial banks in our sample. 
Data from call reports 
We obtain data on loan loss reserves, loan loss provisions, and net charge-offs, as well as 
other accounting variables, from the call reports filed by banks with the Federal Reserve, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. The 
data is available in machine-readable form at the Chicago Federal Reserve website.9 We begin 
with the 8,076 call reports filed by banks in the 50 states and Washington D.C. for the fiscal year 
ending in December 2007. To be included in our sample, the bank must have positive total assets 
and total loans for the fiscal years ending in December 2006 and December 2007; we require 
data from both 2006 and 2007 to construct variables that measure changes from 2006 to 2007. 
This requirement reduces the sample to 7,383 banks. To merge the bank failure data with the call 
report data, we obtain the RSSD ID of the banks in the bank failure dataset. The RSSD ID is the 
unique identifying number assigned by the Federal Reserve for all financial institutions, main 
offices, and branches. Of the 7,383 banks in our sample, 269 banks failed between 2008 and 
2010. Thus, after imposing the data availability constraints, our sample captures 269  of the 279 
                                                 
9 http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/banking/financial_institution_reports/commercial_bank_data.cfm 
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failures during this period. A bank failure rate of 3.6% is clearly significant by historical 
standards, and we note that many banks have continued to fail after 2010.10  
Table 2 presents the distribution of the 7,383 banks across the different states and regions 
of the United States. The states with the most number of bank failures are Georgia, Illinois, and 
California, with 49, 36, and 27 failures, respectively. Nevada has the highest failure rate (the 
percentage of all banks that failed), at 29%. From a regional perspective, while there were more 
bank failures in the south, the failure rate is higher in the west, at 8.7%. The uneven distribution 
of bank failures across different states and regions is consistent with the fact there was 
significant variation in the impact of the economic crisis across the United States. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Table 3 provides some descriptive information on the regulatory capital ratios and loan 
loss reserves in 2007 for the 7,383 banks. The mean total risk-based capital ratio and the Tier 1 
risk-based capital ratio are 16.69% and 15.59%, respectively. The inclusion of Tier 2 capital 
adds, on average, 1.086% of risk-weighted assets to the total risk-based capital ratio.11 The 
median total risk-based capital ratio and Tier 1 risk-based capital are 14.13% and 13.05%, 
respectively. Given that the minimum required total risk-based capital ratio and the Tier 1 capital 
ratio are, respectively, 8% and 4%, a typical bank in 2007 meets the minimum requirements, as 
expected. However, the total risk-based capital for a bank at the 25th percentile is 11.69%, which 
is just 2.69% above the requirement of 8%. Finally, Table 3, Panel A demonstrates that in 
                                                 
10 The fact that there were 21 more commercial bank failures and 2 thrift failures in the first two months of 2011 
suggest that many banks are still facing difficulties despite some indications of economic stabilization in 2010. 
11 Note that the allowable Tier 2 capital (i.e., the capital that can be considered as part of total capital) is the lesser of 
Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. In untabulated analyses, we find that the allowable Tier 2 capital is the same as the actual 
Tier 2 capital for all commercial banks in our sample because Tier 2 capital is always less than Tier 1 capital. 
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practice, Tier 2 capital is almost entirely made up of loan loss reserves. Mean loan loss reserves 
scaled by risk-weighted assets used in Tier 2 capital is 1.036%, relative to a mean Tier 2 capital 
ratio of 1.086%. Loan loss reserves make up about 95% (1.036/1.086) of Tier 2 capital, and 
about 6% (= 1.036 / 16.685) of total risk-based capital. Table 3, Panel B provides some 
univariate analyses between banks that failed and those that did not. We observe that banks that 
failed have lower Tier 1 capital but higher Tier 2 capital in 2007. In addition, these banks also 
have higher loan loss reserves that are used as Tier 2 capital. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
IV. Research design and results 
Bank failure and regulatory capital 
In this paper, we rely on survival analyses that use hazard models to study the relation 
between bank failure and loan loss reserve accounting. Hazard models are appropriate to our 
context since they incorporate information about the time that elapses before an event (in our 
case, a bank failure) occurs. These models have been used in numerous research contexts, 
especially when the “hazardous” event of interest is rare (e.g., Lee and Urrutia 1996; Shumway 
2001; Carpenter and Lewis 2004). For example, Shumway (2001) demonstrates that hazard 
models outperform static models such as logit models in predicting bankruptcy. 
Our tests rely on the widely used Cox proportional hazard model (Cox 1972; Cox and 
Oakes 1984), which has the following form: 
0 i ih( t ) h (t )exp( X )         (1) 
where Xi is a vector of explanatory variables and βi is a vector of coefficients. Note that no 
explicit intercept parameter is estimated for the proportional hazards model.  As the log-
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likelihood function and survival function estimators are invariant with respect to translations of 
any of the independent variables, no intercept is needed. The hazard rate is the risk of failure at a 
certain point in time, conditional on survival until that point in time. h0(t) represents the baseline 
hazard rate that is exclusively a function of time, while exp(Xiβi) represents the dependence of 
the hazard rate on a vector of explanatory variables X. In the Cox model, the coefficient on the 
explanatory variable represents the proportional change in the hazard rate for a one-unit change 
in the explanatory variable.  
The focus of this paper is to examine how bank failure hazard is associated with changes 
in loan loss reserves and its components: (i) loan loss provisions and (ii) net charge-offs. To 
examine the above, we use the following hazard models:   
h(t) = h0(t) exp (β1 CAPITAL +∑i βi CONTROLi + ε)    (2) 
The initiation date for the survival analysis is January 1, 2008, and the final date is December 31, 
2010. h(t) is the hazard of bank failure at time t. t is the number of days from January 1, 2008 to 
the failure date; for banks that did not fail, t is the number of days from January 1, 2008 to 
December 31, 2010. 
The independent variables of interest are TOTAL_RBC, TIER1_RBC, and TIER2_RBC, 
which are, respectively, the total capital, Tier 1 capital, and Tier 2 capital, expressed as a 
percentage of risk-weighted assets. CONTROL is a set of control variables added to mitigate 
omitted correlated variable bias: REAL_ESTATE_LOAN, NPL, ROA, UNINSURED_DEPOSIT, 
LIQUIDITY, TOTAL_ASSETS, and various regional dummies as fixed effects. All the 
independent variables are measured at the end of 2007, i.e., before the occurrence of the bank 
failures.  
 If regulatory capital is indeed acting as a buffer against bank failure, we expect the 
coefficients on the various types of capital (i.e., TOTAL_RBC, TIER1_RBC, and TIER2_RBC) to 
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be positive. REAL_ESTATE_LOAN is loans and leases as a percentage of average beginning and 
ending total assets. Exposure to real estate loans was a key factor behind the financial difficulties 
that many banks faced during the crisis. We expect banks with relatively more real estate loans 
to be at a greater risk of failure. NPL is non-performing loans as a percentage of total loans; we 
expect banks with relatively greater NPL to exhibit greater failure risk. ROA is net income as a 
percentage of average beginning and ending total assets. We expect more profitable banks to be 
less likely to fail.  
UNINSURED_DEPOSIT represents uninsured deposits as the percentage of total 
deposits. The FDIC places a cap on maximum insurable deposits. We expect banks with more 
uninsured deposits to be at a greater risk of failure during times of crisis due to the greater 
possibility of “deposit runs”. LIQUIDITY denotes the cash and balances due from depository 
institutions as a percentage of total deposits. Cash and balances due from depository institutions 
provide liquidity during deposit withdrawals, which tend to be higher during economic crises. 
Hence, a bank with higher LIQUIDITY is likely to face fewer difficulties in meeting withdrawal 
requests, and be less likely to fail. TOTAL_ASSETS is the total assets of the bank in millions, a 
proxy for bank size. From casual observation of the failed banks, it becomes apparent that both 
small and large banks have failed. However, we control for size because it is an important 
consideration when closing a bank, particularly in light of the possibility of governmental 
support if the bank is “too big to fail”. 
REGION2 is an indicator variable equaling one if a bank is in the Midwest region, and 
zero otherwise; REGION3 and REGION4 are defined analogously for the Southern and Western 
regions respectively. By construction, the Northeast serves as the benchmark region. We include 
region dummies to mitigate concerns that the empirical results are driven by heterogeneous 
17 
 
regional characteristics. Examples of such heterogeneity include differences in the expansion of 
the property sector, or unemployment differences.12  
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables in the hazard model; the 
descriptive statistics for TOTAL_RBC, TIER1_RBC, and TIER2_RBC are in Table 3. The mean 
value of FAIL indicates that 3.6% of the banks in our sample failed in 2008, 2009, or 2010. The 
remaining variables measure various characteristics of the banks as indicated in their December 
2007 call reports. On average, 69.27% of the total loans made by the banks are real estate loans. 
Non-performing loans constitute, on average, 2.525% of total loans. At the end of 2007, the 
banks are generally profitable, with a mean and median return-on-assets of 0.863% and 0.921%, 
respectively. The average uninsured deposits as a percentage of total assessable deposits are 
high, at 40.5%. The average cash-to-deposit is 5.309%. Finally, the mean and median total assets 
of the banks are $0.465 billion and $0.133 billion.13 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
  
Table 5 presents the results of the hazard models that examine how the likelihood of bank 
failures is associated with regulatory capital. Panel A presents the regression coefficients along 
with associated standard errors. Panel B presents the hazard ratios. In Panel A, the coefficients of 
interest are those on total capital (TOTAL_RBC) in the first column, and those on Tier 1 capital 
(TIER1_RBC) and Tier 2 capital (TIER2_RBC) in the second column. In the first column, the 
                                                 
12 We are not able to include state dummies because there are many states with no bank failures. Hence, it is not 
possible to examine how within-state variation in loan loss reserve accounting is associated with within-state 
variation in the risk of bank failure. 
13  The current tax code requires the deferral of tax benefits from loan loss reserve increases via loan loss provisions 
only if the bank’s total assets are above $0.5 billion. Given that the 75th percentile of total assets is $0.303 billion in 
our sample, the banks in our sample largely need not defer the tax benefits of loan loss reserve increases via 
provisions. 
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coefficient on TOTAL_RBC is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting 
that a higher level of total regulatory capital is associated with a lower failure risk on average. 
This result is consistent with regulatory capital serving as a buffer against bank failure. In the 
second column, the coefficient on TIER1_RBC is negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level, suggesting that a higher level of Tier 1 capital is associated with a higher likelihood of 
bank failure. In sharp contrast, the coefficient on TIER2_RBC is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level, suggesting that a higher level of Tier 2 capital is associated with a 
higher likelihood of bank failure.  
Panel B of Table 5 reports the hazard of bank failure in terms of the hazard ratio, which is 
the effect of an explanatory variable on the hazard of bank failure. For each continuous 
explanatory variable (i.e., all variables except the region dummies), we use a single-standard 
deviation increase in the variable to assess its economic effect on bank failure risk.14 For each 
region dummy, we examine the effect of a one-unit increase; this effectively compares the bank 
failure risk for a particular region with that of the Northeast region. The hazard ratio for 
TOTAL_RBC in the first column indicates that a single-standard deviation increase in total 
capital reduces the risk of bank failure by 66.1% (= 100% - 33.9%). The results in the second 
column indicate that a single standard deviation increase in Tier 1 capital reduces the risk of 
bank failure by 65.9%. In contrast, a single standard deviation increase in Tier 2 increases the 
risk of bank failure by 11.8% (= 111.8% - 100%). Hence, as expected, Tier 1 capital has an 
economically significant effect in reducing bank failure risk. Importantly, after controlling for 
the effect of Tier 1 capital, our results suggest that Tier 2 capital is actually associated with an 
                                                 
14 To compute the hazard ratio for a one standard-deviation increase, we first multiply the coefficient on the 
explanatory variable from Table 4, Panel A by the standard deviation of the variable from Table 3, Panel A. We then 
take the exponential of this result. For example, the hazard ratio of TOTAL_RBC is the exponential of the coefficient 
of 0-0.141 on TOTAL_RBC multiplied by its standard deviation of 7.668%. 
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increase in bank failure risk, instead of acting as a buffer against the risk of failure in accordance 
with its designation as capital. 
Among the control variables, exposure to real estate has a very significant economic 
effect on bank failure risk. A single standard-deviation increase in REAL_ESTATE_LOAN 
increases the risk of bank failure by 112.3% (= 212.3% – 100%); this result is consistent with 
conventional wisdom that the collapse of the real estate market was a key driver of banks’ 
financial problems. We also observe economically significant effects for liquidity. A standard-
deviation increase in LIQUIDITY reduces the bank failure risk by 43.3% (= 100% – 56.7%). 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
In sum, we find that Tier 1 capital has a significant effect in reducing bank failure risk. 
However, Tier 2 capital seems to fail to perform its role as capital that buffers the bank against 
failure. We investigate the underlying reasons for this phenomenon in the next section. 
The role of loan loss reserve accounting   
 In this section, since loan loss reserves constitute the primary component of Tier 2 
capital, we examine how changes in loan loss reserves just prior to the crisis (i.e., in 2007) 
influence the relation between bank failure and Tier 2 capital. To better identify the underlying 
reasons that changes in loan loss reserves influence this relation, we decompose changes in loan 
reserves into normal and abnormal changes in loan loss reserves. To do so, we use the following 
regression model to decompose changes in loan loss reserves in 2007 and 2006: 
CH_LLR = β0 + β1 CH_NPL + β2 LOAN + β3 REAL_ESTATE_LOAN  
+ β4 OTHER_LOAN + ε          (3) 
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where CH_LLR is the change in loan loss reserves as a percentage of total loans, CH_NPL is the 
change in non-performing loans as a percentage of total loans, LOAN is the loans as a percentage 
of total assets, REAL_ESTATE_LOAN is real estate loans as a percentage of total loans, and 
OTHER_LOAN is the sum of commercial and industrial loans, loans to depository institutions, 
agricultural loans, loans to individuals, and loans to foreign governments as a percentage of total 
loans.15 In untabulated analyses, we find that the average REAL_ESTATE_LOAN 
(OTHER_LOAN) is 69.2% (18.7%) and 68.7% (19%) in 2007 and 2006, respectively. 
 Table 6 presents the results of regressions used to model changes in loan loss reserves. 
These results are consistent across 2007 and 2006. They indicate that, as expected, changes in 
loan loss reserves are highly positively associated with non-performing loans. Banks with more 
loans as a percentage of total assets also have higher changes in loan loss reserves. Interestingly, 
we find that having more real estate loans as a percentage of total loans is associated with lower 
changes in loan loss reserves. This result appears to reflect the notion that prevailed prior to the 
current economic crisis— real estate loans were typically considered “safe loans” due to the 
perceived low likelihood of a downturn in the real estate market. We also find that the loans 
included in OTHER_LOAN are negatively associated with increases in loan loss reserves. We 
term the residual and predicted value from the regressions as an abnormal change in loan loss 
reserves and a normal change in loan loss reserves, respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
To examine the effect of changes in loan loss reserves prior to the crisis on the relation 
between bank failure and Tier 2 capital, we test whether the positive association between bank 
                                                 
15 Both REAL_ESTATE_LOAN and OTHER_LOAN exclude loans for purchasing or carrying securities and lease 
financing receivables. 
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failure and Tier 2 capital is more pronounced when banks increase their loan loss reserves in 
2007. Because we are examining the moderating effects of changes in loan loss reserves, we 
modify Eq. (2) by introducing the change in loan loss reserves and its components as interaction 
terms with regulatory capital. To reduce the effect of outliers and to ease the exposition when 
interaction terms are present, we make use of the following dummy variables in our analyses: 
CH_LLR is an indicator variable equaling one if there is an increase in loan loss reserves in 2007, 
and zero otherwise. ABN_CH_LLR is an indicator variable equaling one if there is an abnormal 
increase in loan loss reserves in 2007, and zero otherwise. The focus of the analyses is on what 
happens when there is an unusual increase in loan loss reserves in 2007. Our results are robust to 
identifying unusual changes in loan loss reserves using an indicator variable equaling one if the 
underlying continuous variable is in the top quartile, and zero otherwise. 
Table 7 begins the analyses by examining how CH_LLR influences the relation between 
bank failure and Tier 2 capital. The coefficient on TIER2_RBC x CH_LLR is positive and 
significant at the 5% level. This suggests that the association between Tier 2 capital and bank 
failure risk is more positive for banks that increased their loan loss reserves in 2007. In the next 
two columns, we examine whether this effect is driven by an abnormal increase in loan loss 
reserves in 2007. In the second column, we find that the coefficient on TIER2_RBC x 
ABN_CH_LLR is positive and significant at the 5% level, consistent with an abnormal increase 
in loan loss reserves driving the association between bank failure and Tier 2 capital. We show in 
the third column that this result is robust to the inclusion of abnormal changes in loan loss 
reserves in 2006 (ABN_CH_LLR_LAG) as a control variable; for completeness and consistency, 
the main and interaction effects of ABN_CH_LLR_LAG are also included.  
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
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As an aside, in untabulated analyses, we examine whether we find similar results with 
abnormal changes in loan loss reserves after controlling for normal changes in loan loss reserves. 
We construct an indicator variable, N_CH_LLR, indicating whether the bank had a normal 
increase in loan loss reserves in 2007, and zero otherwise; the normal increase in loan loss 
reserves is based on the predicted loan loss reserves from Eq. (3). N_CH_LLR is included in the 
regression with interaction and main effects, as well as with a lag. While we find that 
TIER2_RBC x ABN_CH_LLR is positive and significant at the 1% level, we find that 
TIER2_RBC x N_CH_LLR is statistically insignificant. 
In robustness tests, we identify banks as reporting abnormally large loan loss reserve 
increases when ABN_CH_LLR is in the top quartile, rather than when it is simply above zero. 
Our results are robust to this specification. Overall, the findings indicate that the quality of Tier 2 
capital is lower (that is, its association with bank failure risk is more positive) when banks report 
abnormally large loan loss reserve increases. 
Cross-sectional analyses 
In this section, we rely on some further cross-sectional analyses to examine whether 
abnormal loan loss reserve increases weaken the quality of Tier 2 capital when they are used to 
opportunistically manage capital upwards. All analyses in this section are performed using the 
full regression specification in the third column of Table 7. Thus, the sample size for the analyses 
is 7,196 firms.  
First, we rely on the fact that there is a constraint on the extent to which banks can add 
back loan loss reserves as regulatory capital. The add-back is limited to 1.25% of gross risk-
weighted assets and banks have to report the excess amount of the allowance for loan and lease 
losses over 1.25% of gross risk-weighted assets (this item is known as “excess allowance for 
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loan and lease losses” in the call reports).  Abnormal loan loss reserve increases are more likely 
to reflect upward capital management incentives for banks below this limit rather than those 
above it. We hypothesize that unusually large loan loss reserve increases impair the quality of 
Tier 2 capital only when managers are not constrained from opportunistically using the add-back 
provision to boost Tier 2 capital. Second, we hypothesize that unusual loan loss reserve increases 
are more likely to reflect capital management incentives and are hence more likely to impair the 
quality of Tier 2 capital in banks with poor audit quality. To the extent that poor audit quality 
increases opportunistic actions, then it is more likely that the abnormal change in loan loss 
reserves is driven by opportunism. Second, we hypothesize that when banks increase their loan 
loss reserves, the quality of Tier 2 capital will be more likely to be impaired by the add-back if 
there are more agency problems in the firm. 
We construct an indicator variable, 1.25% LIMIT, equaling one if the bank reports excess 
loan loss reserves at the end of 2006, and zero otherwise. Of the 7,196 banks in the sample, 
2,581 banks are constrained from adding back loan loss reserves as Tier 2 capital in 2007. We 
then examine whether there is a difference in the effect of an abnormal change in loan loss 
reserves on the relation between bank failure and Tier 2 capital by running separate regressions 
for banks below and above the 1.25% limit. 
Table 8 reports the results of the analysis. The first (second) column reports the results 
for firms with loan loss reserves below (above) the 1.25% limit. As Table 8 demonstrates, we 
find that Tier 2 capital is associated with a higher probability of bank failure, and is thus of lower 
quality, in both subsamples. More importantly, in the first column, we observe that the 
coefficient on TIER2_RBC x ABN_CH_LLR is positive and significant at the 5% level. In 
contrast, we observe that this coefficient is insignificant in the second column. Hence, the 
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evidence suggests that abnormal loan loss reserve increases weaken the quality of Tier 2 capital 
when they are likely driven by capital management incentives. 
In subsequent tests, we proxy for audit quality using the reported level of audit work 
performed for the bank. In their March 2008 call reports, banks are required to report the most 
comprehensive level of auditing work performed for the bank by independent external auditors 
during 2007. The possible levels are indicated in Appendix C. We construct an indicator 
variable, AUDIT_QUALITY, equaling one if there was an independent audit of the bank 
conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards by a certified public 
accounting firm that submits a report on the bank, and zero otherwise. Of the 7,196 banks in the 
sample, 2,727 banks are considered as having a high audit quality. 
To proxy for agency problems, we rely on the level of overhead expenses. High overhead 
costs can signal unwarranted managerial perquisites, poor internal controls, and operating 
inefficiencies that are common symptoms of agency problems (e.g., Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Huizinga 2001; Betrand and Mullainathan 2003; Barth et al. 2008; Giroud and Mueller 
2010). In the call reports, these expenses are recorded as “total non-interest expense” in the 
income statement. “Non-interest expense” excludes loan loss provisions, but includes expenses 
on salaries and employee benefits as well as expenses on premises and fixed assets. We construct 
an indicator variable, AGENCY PROBLEM, equaling one if the bank has, in 2007, overhead 
expenses as a percentage of total assets that is above the median. 
Table 9 reports the results of the regressions that examine whether the influence of 
abnormal loan loss reserves on the quality of Tier 2 capital varies with audit quality and agency 
problems. From the first two columns, we observe that the coefficient on TIER2_RBC x 
ABN_CH_LLR is positive and significant at the 1% level but is insignificant when audit quality 
is high. In the next two columns, we find that this coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% 
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level when there is a high level of agency problems but that it is insignificant when the level of 
agency problems is low. Taken together, the results indicate that the impairment of Tier 2 capital 
due to opportunistic management occurs only when there is poor audit quality and a higher level 
of agency problems.  
V. Conclusion 
We rely on the recent economic crisis to test the effects of regulatory capital in mitigating 
the risk of financial instability for banks. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to 
provide systematic evidence that regulatory departure from accounting and economic principles 
could have contributed to Tier 2 capital’s adverse consequences during the economic crisis. 
Based on economic principles, loan loss reserves should not be added back as capital because 
they are accrued loan losses; however regulatory guidelines allow for them to be added back, up 
to a certain limit, so as to increase the incentives for banks to make loan loss reserves This add-
back of loan loss reserves has recently been the subject of extensive regulatory debate and bank 
lobbying. Some regulators and banks have called for an increase in the limit, while other 
regulators have cautioned that such an action would reduce the quality of capital as a buffer 
against financial instability. 
The evidence in this paper indicates that bank failure risk during 2008-2010 is associated 
negatively with Tier 1 capital, but positively with Tier 2 capital. Further, Tier 2 capital is more 
highly associated with failure risk when banks report unusually large increases in loan loss 
reserves. Existing literature suggests that banks can report abnormal loan loss reserve increases 
to manage regulatory capital upwards (Ahmed et al. 1999). We identify the extent to which 
abnormal loan loss increases are likely to reflect upward capital management incentives using 
three proxies: (a) whether banks are less constrained by regulation in adding back loan loss 
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reserves as Tier 2 capital, (b) the quality of bank audit and (b) the likely level of agency 
problems in the bank. We find that when abnormal loan loss reserve increases reflect upward 
capital management incentives, their influence on the positive association between Tier 2 capital 
and bank failure risk is more pronounced. Our results indicate that Tier 2 capital does not 
necessarily provide a buffer against the risk of failure during times of economic crises and is in 
fact associated with higher failure risk, in contrast to conventional notions of capital.   
Recent proposals that were under consideration by regulators include calls to increase, 
even eliminate, the limit on the amount of loan loss reserves that can be added back as regulatory 
capital. In this context, our findings are important not just from a policy review perspective, but 
also from a policy-making perspective. To the extent that regulatory capital is meant to provide 
financial stability especially in times of crises, the findings question the rationale for considering 
loan loss reserves as Tier 2 capital, and strike a cautionary note against expanding the add-back 
of loan reserves to regulatory capital. 
27 
 
References 
 
Ahmed, A. S., C. Takeda, and S. Thomas. 1999. Bank loan loss provisions: A reexamination of 
capital management, earnings management and signaling effects. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics 28: 1-25. 
 
Barth, J., G. Caprio, and R. Levine. 2008. Bank regulations are change: For better or worse? 
Comparative Economic Studies 50: 537-563. 
 
Beatty, A., S. L. Chamberlain, and J. Magliolo. 1995. Managing financial reports of  commercial 
banks: The influence of taxes, regulatory capital, and earnings. Journal of Accounting 
Research 33: 231-261. 
 
Beatty, A., and S. Liao. 2011. Do delays in expected loss recognition affect banks’ willingness to 
lend? Journal of Accounting and Economics, forthcoming. 
 
Bennett, R. L. 2001. Failure resolution and asset liquidation: Results of an international survey of 
deposit insurers, FDIC Banking Review 14(1): 1-28. 
 
Betrand, M., and S. Mullainathan. 2003. Enjoying the quite life? Corporate governance and 
managerial preferences. Journal of Political Economy 111: 1043-1075. 
 
Bushman, R.M., and C.D. Williams. 2009. Accounting discretion, loan loss provisioning, and 
discipline of banks’ risk-taking, Working Paper.  
 
Carpenter, D., and D. Lewis. 2004. Political learning from rare events: Poisson inference, fiscal 
constraints, and the lifetime of bureaus. Political Analysis 12: 201-232. 
 
Claessens S., A. Demirgüç-Kunt, and H. Huizinga. 2001. How does foreign entry affect domestic 
banking markets? Journal of Banking and Finance 25: 891-911. 
 
Cox, D. R. 1972. Regression models and life-tables. Journal of the Royal Statistics Society 34: 
187-220. 
 
Cox, D. R., and Oakes, D. 1984. Analysis of Survival Data. New York: Chapman & Hall. 
 
Dechow, P. M., 1994. Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm performance: 
The role of accounting accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 18: 3-42. 
 
Diamond, D. W., and R. G. Rajan. 2000. A theory of bank capital. Journal of Finance 55: 2431-
2465. 
 
Estrella, A., S. Park, and S. Peristiani. 2000. Capital ratios as predictors of bank failure. FRBNY 
Economic Policy Review July 2000: 33-52. 
 
Federal Reserve Board. 2009. Invitation to comment: Risk-based capital guidelines; Capital 
adequacy guidelines; Capital maintenance: Regulatory capital; Impact of Modifications 
28 
 
to generally accepted accounting principles; Consolidation of asset-backed commercial 
paper programs (Regulations H and Y) [R-1368]. 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/index.cfm?doc_id=R%2D1368&doc_ver
=1&ShowAll=Yes) 
 
Giroud, X., and H. Mueller. 2010. Does corporate governance matter in competitive industries? 
Journal of Financial Economics 95: 312-331. 
 
Lee, S. H., and J. L., Urrutia. 1996. Analysis and prediction of insolvency in the property-
liability insurance industry: A comparison of logit and hazard models. Journal of Risk 
and Insurance 63: 121-130. 
 
Moyer, S. E. 1990. Capital adequacy ratio regulations and accounting choices in commercial 
banks. Journal of Accounting and Economics 13: 123-154. 
 
Shumway, T. 2001. Forecasting bankruptcy more accurately: A simple hazard model. Journal of 
Business 74: 101-124. 
 
Wall, D. L., and T. W. Koch. 2000. Bank loan-loss accounting: A review of theoretical and 
empirical evidence. Economic Review Q2 2000: 1-20. 
  
29 
 
Appendix A Example of an FDIC press release on bank failure 
MB Financial Bank, National Association, Chicago, Illinois, Assumes All of the Deposits of 
Corus Bank, National Association, Chicago, Illinois 
  
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 
September 11, 2009  
Media Contact: 
LaJuan Williams-Dickerson 
Office (202) 898-3876 
Email: lwilliams-dickerson@fdic.gov  
Corus Bank, National Association, Chicago, Illinois, was closed today by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, which appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) as receiver. To protect the depositors, the FDIC entered into a purchase and assumption 
agreement with MB Financial Bank, National Association, Chicago, Illinois, to assume all of the 
deposits of Corus Bank, N.A. 
The eleven branches of Corus Bank will reopen on their next normally scheduled business day as 
branches of MB Financial Bank. Depositors of Corus Bank will automatically become depositors 
of MB Financial Bank. Deposits will continue to be insured by the FDIC, so there is no need for 
customers to change their banking relationship to retain their deposit insurance coverage. 
Customers should continue to use their existing branches until MB Financial Bank can fully 
integrate the deposit records of Corus Bank. 
This evening and over the weekend, depositors of Corus Bank can access their money by writing 
checks or using ATM or debit cards. Checks drawn on the bank will continue to be processed. 
Loan customers should continue to make their payments as usual. 
As of June 30, 2009, Corus Bank had total assets of $7 billion and total deposits of 
approximately $7 billion. MB Financial Bank will pay the FDIC a premium of 0.2 percent to 
assume all of the deposits of Corus Bank. In addition to assuming all of the deposits of the failed 
bank, MB Financial Bank agreed to purchase approximately $3 billion of the assets, comprised 
mainly of cash and marketable securities. The FDIC will retain the remaining assets for later 
disposition. The FDIC plans to sell substantially all of the remaining assets of Corus Bank in the 
next 30 days in a private placement transaction. 
Customers who have questions about today's transaction can call the FDIC toll-free at 1-800-
823-5017. The phone number will be operational this evening until 9:00 p.m., Central Daylight 
Time (CDT); on Saturday from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., CDT; on Sunday from noon to 6:00 p.m., 
CDT; and thereafter from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m., CDT. Interested parties can also visit the 
FDIC's Web site at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/corus.html. 
The FDIC estimates that the cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) will be $1.7 billion. MB 
Financial Bank's acquisition of all the deposits was the "least costly" resolution for the FDIC's 
DIF compared to alternatives. Corus Bank is the 90th FDIC-insured institution to fail in the 
nation this year, and the sixteenth in Illinois. The last FDIC-insured institution closed in the state 
was Platinum Community Bank, Rolling Meadows, on September 4, 2009. 
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# # # 
Congress created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1933 to restore public confidence 
in the nation's banking system. The FDIC insures deposits at the nation's 8,195 banks and 
savings associations and it promotes the safety and soundness of these institutions by identifying, 
monitoring and addressing risks to which they are exposed. The FDIC receives no federal tax 
dollars – insured financial institutions fund its operations. 
FDIC press releases and other information are available on the Internet at www.fdic.gov, by 
subscription electronically (go to www.fdic.gov/about/subscriptions/index.html) and may also be 
obtained through the FDIC's Public Information Center (877-275-3342 or 703-562-2200). PR-
168-2009 
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Appendix B Levels of auditing work. 
1 = Independent audit of the bank conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards by a certified public accounting firm which submits a report on the bank 
 
2 = Independent audit of the bank’s parent holding company conducted 
in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards by a certified public accounting firm 
which submits a report on the consolidated holding company (but not on the bank separately) 
 
3 = Attestation on bank management’s assertion on the effectiveness of the bank’s internal 
control over financial reporting by a certified public accounting firm 
 
4 = Directors’ examination of the bank conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards by a certified public accounting firm (may be required by state chartering authority) 
 
5 = Directors’ examination of the bank performed by other external auditors (may be required by 
state chartering authority) 
 
6 = Review of the bank’s financial statements by external auditors 
 
7 = Compilation of the bank’s financial statements by external auditors 
 
8 = Other audit procedures 
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Table 1 Distribution of bank failures from 2001 to 2010 
This table provides information on bank and thrift failures by calendar year from 2001 to 2010.  Panel A (B) shows 
the failure of commercial banks (thrifts).  
Panel A: Failure of commercial banks 
Year Failures Total  Assets ($m) 
Total  
Deposits ($m)   
Bank failures 
with FDIC cost 
info 
Total  
Cost ($m) 
  
2001 3 58.6 51.6 3 4.6 
2002 10 2,656.4 2,291.6 4 361.9 
2003 3 961.2 903.2 2 135.6 
2004 3 150.8 140.1 3 14.1 
2005 0 0.0 0.0 . . 
2006 0 0.0 0.0 . . 
2007 2 102.5 89.2 1 3.0 
2008 20 17,963.8 14,898.6 19 4,580.5 
2009 120 119,175.1 97,596.8 120 24,100.9 
2010 139 84,811.4 71,956.4 139 20,243.7 
              
 
Panel B: Failure of thrifts 
Year Failures Total  Assets ($m) 
Total  
Deposits ($m)   
Bank failures 
with FDIC cost 
info 
Total  
Cost ($m) 
  
2001 1 2,300.0 1,600.0 0 . 
2002 1 52.0 40.0 0 . 
2003 0 0.0 0.0 . . 
2004 1 12.3 9.8 0 . 
2005 0 0.0 0.0 . . 
2006 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 
2007 1 2,500.0 2,300.0 1 110.0 
2008 5 401,694.6 224,332.1 5 12,842.0 
2009 19 51,709.1 39,844.6 18 12,174.8 
2010 18 11,494.6 8,837.4 18 1,909.5 
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Table 2 Within-sample distribution of commercial bank failures across the United States 
 
This table shows the distribution of 269 commercial bank failures in 2008, 2009, and 2010 within our sample of 
7,383 commercial banks. The sample is the number of commercial banks in existence at the end of 2007 that have 
the data needed to compute the variables used in our analysis (see Table 4). Within each parenthesis, the number of 
bank failures is indicated on the left; the total number of banks is indicated on the right. 
 
New England Middle Atlantic
Connecticut (0 / 45) New Jersey (3 / 84)
Maine (0 / 24) New York (3 / 128)
Massachusetts (1 / 156) Pennsylvania (2 / 197)
New Hampshire (0 / 16)
Rhode Island (0 / 8)
Vermont (0 / 12)
East North Central
Indiana (1 / 120) Iowa (0 / 366) Nebraska (1 / 232)
Illinois (36 / 610) Kansas (6 / 337) North Dakota (0 / 92)
Michigan (8 / 146) Minnesota (15 / 411) South Dakota (1 / 84)
Ohio (2 / 186) Missouri (8 / 326)
Wisconsin (2 / 265)
South Atlantic East South Central West South Central
Delaware (0 / 23) Alabama (3 / 143) Arkansas (2 / 141)
District of Columbia (0 / 6) Kentucky (0 / 184) Louisiana (1 / 138)
Florida (35 / 252) Mississippi (1 / 92) Oklahoma (2 / 252)
Georgia (49 / 320) Tennessee (0 / 178) Texas (7 / 600)
Maryland (2 / 55)
North Carolina (2 / 88)
South Carlina (3 / 67)
Virginia (0 / 98)
West Virginia (0 / 62)
Pacific
Arizona (7 / 45) Montana (0 / 74) Alaska (0 / 5)
Colorado (3 / 135) Utah (5 / 59) California (27 / 259)
Idaho (0 / 15) Nevada (9 / 31) Hawaii (0 / 7)
New Mexico (1 / 46) Wyoming (1 / 40) Oregon (6 / 36)
Washington (14 / 87)
Mountain
Region 1: Northeast (9 / 670 = 1.34% )
Region 2: Midwest (80 / 3175 = 2.52% )
West North Central
Region 3: South (107 / 2699 = 3.96% )
Region 4: West (73 / 839 = 8.70% )
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 Table 3 Bank failures and capital ratios 
 
This table provides information on capital ratios. The sample consists of 7,383 commercial banks; the capital ratios 
are based on their call reports as of December 2007. TOTAL_RBC is total risk-based capital, i.e., total regulatory 
capital (i.e., sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 regulatory capital) as a percentage of risk-weighted assets. TIER1_RBC 
(TIER2_RBC) is Tier 1 (Tier 2) regulatory capital as a percentage of risk-weighted assets. Panel A presents the 
summary statistics for all banks. In Panel B, tests of differences between non-failed and failed banks are conducted. 
All the variables have been winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles within the year. Significance levels are based on 
two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics for all banks 
 
Variable Mean Std P25 Median P75 
  
TOTAL_RBC 16.685 7.668 11.690 14.130 18.670 
  
Components of  total risk-based capital ratio: 
TIER1_RBC 15.590 7.693 10.600 13.050 17.570 
TIER2_RBC 1.086 0.350 0.911 1.119 1.252 
Deductions for TOTAL_RBC scaled by risk-weighted assets 0.001 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
Loan loss reserves in Tier 2 capital scaled by risk-weighted 
assets 1.036 0.247 0.897 1.103 1.251 
            
 
Panel B: Univariate comparison of non-failed banks and failed banks 
    FAIL = 0 FAIL = 1 Difference 
  
Number of banks 7,114 269 
  
TOTAL_RBC 16.837 12.670 -4.167 *** 
  
Components of  total risk-based capital ratio: 
TIER1_RBC 15.748 11.414 -4.334 *** 
TIER2_RBC 1.080 1.223 0.142 *** 
Deductions for TOTAL_RBC scaled by risk-
weighted assets 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
  
Loan loss reserves in Tier 2 capital scaled by risk-
weighted assets 1.033 1.135 0.103 *** 
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics  
This table provides some descriptive statistics of the variables (other than TOTAL_RBC, TIER1_RBC, and 
TIER2_RBC, whose descriptive statistics are in Table 3) that are used in the analysis of bank failure. The sample 
consists of 7,383 commercial banks. FAIL is an indicator variable equaling one if the bank failed in 2008, 2009, or 
2010, and zero otherwise. The values of the remaining variables are based on their call reports as at December 2007. 
CH_LLR is the change in loan loss reserves as a percentage of total loans.  REAL_ESTATE_LOAN is real estate 
loans as a percentage of total loans. NPL is non-performing loans (i.e., loans past due 30 days, 90 days, and non-
interest-accruing) as a percentage of total loans. ROA is net income as a percentage of total assets. 
UNINSURED_DEPOSIT is uninsured assessable deposits as a percentage of total assessable deposits. LIQUIDITY is 
the cash and balances due from depository institutions and securities as a percentage of total deposits. TOTAL 
ASSETS is total assets in billions. All the variables have been winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles within the 
year.  
 
  
Variable Mean Std Dev P25 Median P75
FAIL 0.036 0.187 0.000 0.000 0.000
CH_LLR 0.106 0.337 -0.026 0.053 0.191
REAL_ESTATE_LOAN 69.272 19.809 58.176 72.948 83.870
NPL 2.525 2.588 0.771 1.806 3.380
ROA 0.863 0.888 0.520 0.921 1.296
UNINSURED_DEPOSIT 40.508 15.670 29.476 38.120 48.963
LIQUIDITY 5.309 4.804 2.812 3.933 5.894
TOTAL_ASSETS 0.465 1.418 0.063 0.133 0.303
CH_LLR_LAG 0.122 0.331 -0.009 0.065 0.193
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Table 5 Bank failure and regulatory capital 
This table presents Cox proportional hazard regressions that analyze the relation between bank failure and regulatory 
capital. The sample consists of 7,383 commercial banks. The definitions of all the variables can be found in Table 4. 
Panel A documents the results of the hazard regressions. The t-statistic of each coefficient is provided in brackets 
below the coefficient. Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Panel B provides some analyses of the relative significance of the variables. For 
each continuous explanatory variable (i.e., all variables except the region dummies), a single-standard deviation 
increase in the variable is used to assess its economic effect on bank failure risk. For each region dummy, a one-unit 
increase in the variable is used; this compares the bank failure risk of a bank in a certain region relative to that of a 
bank in the Northeast region. 
 
Panel A: Regression results 
 
 
  
TOTAL_RBC -0.141***
[-6.86]
TIER1_RBC -0.140***
[-6.85]
TIER2_RBC 0.320**
[1.99]
REAL_ESTATE_LOAN 0.038*** 0.038***
[7.30] [7.30]
NPL 0.200*** 0.196***
[12.77] [12.36]
ROA -0.326*** -0.318***
[-5.77] [-5.58]
UNINSURED_DEPOSIT 0.014*** 0.014***
[3.43] [3.25]
LIQUIDITY -0.117*** -0.118***
[-4.00] [-3.99]
TOTAL_ASSETS 0.051 0.016
[1.40] [0.42]
REGION2 1.146*** 1.129***
[3.21] [3.17]
REGION3 1.151*** 1.126***
[3.28] [3.22]
REGION4 2.113*** 2.103***
[5.87] [5.84]
Dependent variable is H(t), hazard of bank failure at time t
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Panel B: Hazard ratios 
 
 
  
TOTAL_RBC 0.339
TIER1_RBC 0.341
TIER2_RBC 1.118
REAL_ESTATE_LOAN 2.123 2.123
NPL 1.678 1.661
ROA 0.749 0.754
UNINSURED_DEPOSIT 1.245 1.245
LIQUIDITY 0.570 0.567
TOTAL_ASSETS ($b) 1.075 1.023
REGION2 3.146 3.093
REGION3 3.161 3.083
REGION4 8.273 8.191
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Table 6 Decomposition of change in loan loss reserves 
 
This table presents the ordinary least squares regressions that decompose changes in loan loss reserves into normal 
and abnormal changes in loan loss reserves. The decomposition is done for changes in loan loss reserves in 2007 and 
2006 for our sample of 7,383 banks. The dependent variable is CH_LLR, which is the change in loan loss reserves as 
a percentage of total loans. REAL_ESTATE_LOAN is real estate loans as a percentage of total loans. CH_NPL is the 
change in non-performing loans (i.e., loans past due 30 days, 90 days, and non-interest-accruing) as a percentage of 
total assets. LOAN is total loans as a percentage of total assets. REAL_ESTATE_LOAN is real estate loans as a 
percentage of total loans. OTHER_LOAN is the sum of commercial and industrial loans, loans to depository 
institutions, agricultural loans, loans to individuals, and loans to foreign governments as a percentage of total loans. 
The t-statistic of each coefficient is provided in brackets below the coefficient. Significance levels are based on two-
tailed tests. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Dependent variable is CH_LLR 
    2007   2006   
  
Intercept -0.022 0.103*** 
  [-0.71] [3.78] 
CH_NPL 0.045*** 0.025*** 
  [23.79] [10.05] 
LOAN 0.003*** 0.003*** 
  [13.12] [11.71] 
REAL_ESTATE_LOAN -0.001*** -0.002*** 
  [-4.13] [-6.31] 
OTHER_LOAN -0.002*** -0.003*** 
  [-4.90] [-9.63] 
    
Observations   7,383   7,197   
Adjusted R-square (%)   10.86   5.21   
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Table 7 The effect of change in loan loss reserves on the relation between bank failure and Tier 2 capital 
This table presents Cox proportional hazard regressions that analyze how a change in loan loss reserves in 2007 
affects the relation between bank failure in 2008, 2009, or 2010 and regulatory capital in 2007. CH_LLR is an 
indicator variable equaling one if there is an increase in loan loss reserves in 2007, and zero otherwise. 
ABN_CH_LLR is an indicator variable equaling one if there is an abnormal increase in loan loss reserves in 2007, 
and zero otherwise. All the other variables are defined in Table 5. The t-statistic of each coefficient is provided in 
brackets below the coefficient. Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
TIER_2_RBC x CH_LLR 1.344**
[2.37]
TIER_2_RBC x ABN_CH_LLR 1.021** 1.163***
[2.45] [2.62]
TIER_2_RBC x ABN_CH_LLR_LAG 0.134
[0.44]
TIER_1_RBC x CH_LLR -0.024
[-0.51]
TIER_1_RBC x ABN_CH_LLR 0.254*** 0.224***
[4.31] [3.60]
TIER_1_RBC x ABN_CH_LLR_LAG 0.097*
[1.89]
TIER2_RBC -0.925* -0.566 -0.803*
[-1.71] [-1.49] [-1.94]
TIER1_RBC -0.118*** -0.344*** -0.392***
[-2.90] [-6.16] [-6.20]
CH_LLR -0.838
[-0.99]
ABN_CH_LLR -3.435*** -3.331***
[-4.09] [-3.72]
ABN_CH_LLR_LAG -0.8
[-1.06]
REAL_ESTATE_LOAN 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.036***
[7.28] [7.25] [6.90]
NPL 0.198*** 0.204*** 0.220***
[12.54] [13.11] [13.64]
ROA -0.308*** -0.229*** -0.153**
[-5.49] [-4.00] [-2.47]
UNINSURED_DEPOSIT 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.010**
[2.93] [2.68] [2.26]
LIQUIDITY -0.110*** -0.106*** -0.117***
[-3.79] [-3.68] [-3.71]
TOTAL_ASSETS 0.005 0.002 0.017
[0.12] [0.05] [0.43]
REGION2 1.146*** 1.065*** 1.122***
[3.22] [2.99] [2.98]
REGION3 1.136*** 1.052*** 1.009***
[3.24] [3.01] [2.71]
REGION4 2.107*** 1.983*** 1.944***
[5.84] [5.51] [5.09]
Observations 7,389 7,389 7,196
Dependent variable is H(t), hazard of bank failure at time t
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Table 8 Cross-sectional variation with 1.25% limit on add-back of loan loss reserves as Tier 2 capital 
This table presents Cox proportional hazard regressions that extend the analysis in Column 3 of Table 7. The 
regressions examine whether there is cross-sectional variation in how abnormal changes in loan loss reserves in 
2007 influence the relation between bank failure in 2008, 2009, or 2010 and regulatory capital in 2007, conditional 
on constraints in adding back loan loss reserves as Tier 2 capital. 1.25% LIMIT is an indicator variable equaling one 
if the bank is constrained in added back loan loss reserves as Tier 2 capital at the end of 2006, and zero otherwise; a 
bank is constrained if its excess loan loss reserves as a percentage of risk-weighted assets is above the 1.25% limit. 
The definitions of all other variables are found in Table 7. The t-statistic of each coefficient is provided in brackets 
below the coefficient. Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
   
Low High
TIER_2_RBC x ABN_CH_LLR 1.339** 0.378
[2.38] [0.45]
TIER_2_RBC x ABN_CH_LLR_LAG 0.178 -0.272
[0.51] [-0.38]
TIER2_RBC 0.214** 0.223***
[2.38] [2.61]
TIER_1_RBC x ABN_CH_LLR 0.149* 0.053
[1.84] [0.79]
TIER_1_RBC x ABN_CH_LLR_LAG -1.134** 0.767
[-2.16] [0.85]
TIER1_RBC -0.445*** -0.334***
[-5.01] [-3.67]
ΔLLR -3.296*** -2.566*
[-2.72] [-1.68]
ΔLLR_LAG -1.345 0.208
[-1.24] [0.16]
REAL_ESTATE_LOAN 0.042*** 0.029***
[6.00] [3.59]
NPL 0.239*** 0.191***
[11.94] [6.79]
ROA -0.160** -0.186*
[-2.00] [-1.83]
UNINSURED_DEPOSIT 0.003 0.230***
[0.55] [3.21]
LIQUIDITY -0.112*** -0.103**
[-2.78] [-2.07]
TOTAL_ASSETS 0.036 -0.087
[0.85] [-0.71]
REGION2 2.016*** -0.077
[3.37] [-0.15]
REGION3 1.762*** 0.03
[2.96] [0.06]
REGION4 2.655*** 1.049**
[4.39] [2.02]
Observations 4,615 2,581
Dependent variable is H(t), hazard of bank failure at time t
1.25% LIMIT
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Table 9  Cross-sectional variation with audit quality and agency problem 
 
This table presents Cox proportional hazard regressions that extend the analysis in Column 3 of Table 7. The 
regressions examine whether there is cross-sectional variation in how abnormal changes in loan loss reserves in 
2007 influence the relation between bank failure in 2008, 2009, or 2010 and regulatory capital in 2007, conditional 
on audit quality and the level of agency problems. AUDIT QUALITY is an indicator variable equaling one if there 
was an independent audit of the bank conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards by a 
certified public accounting firm which submits a report on the bank, and zero otherwise. AGENCY PROBLEM is an 
indicator variable equaling one if the bank has overhead expenses as a percentage of total assets that is above the 
median in 2007. The definitions of all the other variables are found in Table 7. The t-statistic of each coefficient is 
provided in brackets below the coefficient. Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Low High Low High
TIER_2_RBC x ABN_CH_LLR 1.615*** 0.637 0.596 1.978**
[2.66] [0.98] [1.08] [2.52]
TIER_2_RBC x ABN_CH_LLR_LAG -0.061 0.186 -0.101 -0.315
[-0.14] [0.41] [-0.25] [-0.54]
TIER2_RBC 0.429*** 0.056 -0.027 0.236***
[3.99] [0.82] [-0.24] [2.90]
TIER_1_RBC x ABN_CH_LLR 0.077 0.109 -0.109 0.127**
[1.01] [1.56] [-0.94] [2.13]
TIER_1_RBC x ABN_CH_LLR_LAG -1.297** -0.205 -0.626 -0.778
[-2.33] [-0.33] [-1.20] [-1.12]
TIER1_RBC -0.550*** -0.273*** -0.306*** -0.376***
[-5.15] [-3.62] [-3.34] [-4.42]
ΔLLR -6.099*** -0.654 -0.268 -4.235***
[-4.33] [-0.56] [-0.18] [-3.22]
ΔLLR_LAG -0.319 -0.95 1.723 -0.725
[-0.30] [-0.87] [1.18] [-0.71]
REAL_ESTATE_LOAN 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.049*** 0.025***
[4.98] [4.55] [5.14] [3.92]
NPL 0.221*** 0.228*** 0.219*** 0.214***
[9.43] [9.96] [8.93] [9.96]
ROA -0.066 -0.230** -0.072 -0.203**
[-0.74] [-2.45] [-0.60] [-2.51]
UNINSURED_DEPOSIT 0.014** 0.006 0.008 0.012**
[2.36] [0.92] [1.19] [2.03]
LIQUIDITY -0.132*** -0.106*** -0.189*** -0.077**
[-2.73] [-2.61] [-3.22] [-2.12]
TOTAL_ASSETS 0.032 0.049 0.064 -0.126
[0.68] [0.64] [1.43] [-1.30]
REGION2 2.053** 1.174*** 1.371** 0.926*
[2.02] [2.73] [2.24] [1.92]
REGION3 1.798* 1.025** 1.334** 0.654
[1.77] [2.49] [2.20] [1.37]
REGION4 2.937*** 1.724*** 2.380*** 1.530***
[2.88] [3.85] [3.87] [3.08]
Observations 4,469 2,727 3,648 3,548
Dependent variable is H(t), hazard of bank failure at time t
AUDIT_QUALITY AGENCY_PROBLEM
